FREEDOM BY DESIGN: OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, the institution of public broadcasting has been
subject to continuing criticism, particularly by those who are con1
cerned that it is ideologically biased. In 2005, public broadcasting
was in the limelight yet again when it was discovered that the Chairman of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), Kenneth
Tomlinson, secretly hired a consultant to monitor PBS programming
2
3
for partisan biases. In the name of “balance,” Tomlinson’s project
examined the programs of Bill Moyers, Tavis Smiley, and Diane
Reihm, and rated their guests according to whether they were liberal
4
or conservative. Related (and perhaps more obviously alarming)
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See Editorial, Squelching Public Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at A22
(noting Newt Gingrich’s efforts ten years before to eliminate funding for public
broadcasting because of its “liberal bias,” and reporting on continuing attacks on the
organization).
2
See Lisa de Moraes, Scrutiny of Broadcast Agency Chief Intensifies, WASH. POST, July
13, 2005, at C1 (describing growing concern among members of Congress about the
project’s examination of the “political leanings” of guests on certain public broadcasting programs).
3
The Corporation for Public Broadcasting has statutory authority to facilitate the
development of programming “with strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all
programs or series of programs of a controversial nature.” 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A)
(2000). Tomlinson relied on this “balance” justification to explain his activities, which
included pushing PBS to create a conservative talk show featuring editorialists from the
Wall Street Journal. See Editorial, Politicizing Public Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2005,
at A22 (noting that as a result of his efforts, many stations took on both Now with Bill
Moyers and the Wall Street Journal show).
4
CORP. FOR PUB. BROAD. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF ALLEGED ACTIONS VIOLATING THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT OF 1967, AS AMENDED, REP. NO.
EPB503-602, at 8 (Nov. 15, 2005).
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categories asked whether program guests were pro- or anti5
administration, as well as “pro-Bush versus anti-Bush.”
After a report on the impropriety of Tomlinson’s activities by the
6
CPB’s Inspector General, Tomlinson resigned from his post. Public
concerns have not abated with his departure, though. While some see
more political pressure on the horizon because of the Republican7
dominated CPB board, others may simply note these are difficulties
inherent in the institution of public broadcasting, regardless of its
8
partisan makeup. Regardless of the argument, however, it is clear
that the interplay between governance and programming content
choices raises salient First Amendment issues of editorial autonomy
9
and independence from government influence.
While the incident leading to Tomlinson’s departure may not itself present a justiciable issue, it points to a significant dilemma related to the structure of public broadcasting. That is, the system is
supposed to be independent, yet nearly half of the state public broadcasters are run by the government, and the President appoints the
leadership of the CPB. As a result, the possibility appears to remain
that ruling political interests could exercise significant influence on
the system by regulating speech directly, or indirectly through funding conditions. In developing noncommercial broadcasting institutions, however, Congress clearly intended to insulate programming

5

Id.
See Paul Farhi, Kenneth Tomlinson Quits Public Broadcasting Board, WASH. POST,
Nov. 4, 2005, at C1 (providing an overview of the reasons for which Tomlinson was
asked to leave, after the release of the Inspector General’s report).
7
See Editorial, Public Broadcasting’s Enemy Within, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at A18
(describing Tomlinson’s political ties to the Republican party and noting that Republicans still control the CPB).
8
See, e.g., Editorial, Liberate PBS, CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2005, at A14 (positing that, because of the declining quality of programming in a landscape with many more channels than thirty years ago, federal funding of public broadcasting is more trouble than
it’s worth).
9
Though this Comment will focus on the American system of public broadcasting,
it is worthwhile to note that the problem of corporate governance with respect to public broadcasting affects other countries’ systems as well. See David Liddiment, Television: Providing a Popular Public Service, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 14, 2005, at 8
(“[P]ress comment has focused on structural matters, in particular whether reengineering the BBC governors into a Trust will fix the conflict of interest at the heart
of BBC governance.”). This may suggest that the problems raised here regarding the
separation of editorial decision making from political pressures (or lack thereof) are
inherent in the very concept of public broadcasting. However, this phenomenon is
outside the scope of this Comment.
6
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decisions from such pressures, so that individual broadcasters could
freely pursue the variety of social roles for public broadcasting.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s traditional First
Amendment analysis cannot provide a solution to this potential contradiction. By embracing an analysis of speech restrictions that focuses on the objective characteristics of the institution in which the
speech occurs, however, the Court can preserve the autonomy of public broadcasters and make protection of speech more robust under its
precedents. Furthermore, when applied at the state and federal levels
of public broadcasting, such an approach may lead to the conclusion
that programming decisions made to advance partisan interests are
presumptively invalid under the First Amendment.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the social roles
and functions of the public broadcasting system in the United States
and considers how that system came into existence. Part II explains
why the Supreme Court’s traditional First Amendment jurisprudence
is poorly equipped to address issues that might exist in reality or in
theory. Taking off from the Court’s opinions in FCC v. League of
Women Voters of California and Arkansas Education Television Commission
v. Forbes, Part III then proposes a First Amendment approach that considers the objective characteristics of how an institution is organized to
determine how the Court’s precedents should apply to it. Part IV
then applies this approach to the U.S. public broadcasting system at
both the federal and state levels, examining the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and New Jersey public television as case studies. Finally, Part V offers a brief summary and conclusion.
I. PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
A. The Structure of the Public Broadcasting Institution
The American system of public broadcasting operates at three in10
terconnected levels. First, individual noncommercial stations make
up the local “bottom” level. These stations receive their broadcast licenses from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and are
subject to the same regulations as commercial broadcasters, though
10

Because these three levels are so firmly linked together, in this Comment I will
refer to the entire chain described here as the “public broadcasting system” or the
“public broadcasting institution.” I do not intend to confuse it with the second link in
that chain–-the Public Broadcasting System-–which is described infra Part IV.
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they receive some special treatment in the form of mandated carriage
11
on cable and satellite distribution systems. These stations are often
licensed to universities and community organizations but are also held
12
by executive agencies within the state governments.
Second, at the national level, most of these local noncommercial
licensees are members of the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), an
13
ostensibly private, nonprofit corporation. PBS’s primary mission is
acquiring programming for distribution to its member broadcasters
14
and providing fundraising, promotional, and logistical support. PBS
makes its own decisions about what programming will be made avail15
able; the decision of whether to broadcast that content, however, is
16
ultimately made by each individual station, based on its own needs.
In addition to the programming they receive from PBS, local stations
17
can create their own programming as well.
Finally, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) is, first
and foremost, the funding arm of the public broadcasting institu18
tion.
Its primary mission is to provide support for local noncommercial stations by financing the development of quality program-

11

LAURA R. LINDER, PUBLIC ACCESS TELEVISION: AMERICA’S ELECTRONIC SOAPBOX
7-13 (1999) (discussing the FCC’s role in regulating public broadcast television amidst
strong growth of local stations).
12
Thirteen states have public broadcasting systems overseen by state government
agencies or commissions. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
13
For the sake of clarity, I am focusing on public broadcast television. Noncommercial radio in the United States is structured very similarly; its programming is distributed by National Public Radio (NPR) and, like PBS, is funded in part by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
14
The package of programming sent to local stations is called the National Programming Service. PBS does not create any programming itself, and its programs are
compiled from individual member stations and outside content producers. See Public
Broadcasting Service, About PBS: Corporate Facts, http://www.pbs.org/aboutpbs/
aboutpbs_corp.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (providing an overview of PBS’s member stations, audience, and programming activities).
15
Id.
16
See Public Broadcasting Service, About PBS: FAQs, http://www.pbs.org/
aboutpbs/aboutpbs_faqanswers.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (noting that each PBS
member station “schedules [its] programming independently”).
17
See, e.g., About WHYY, http://www.whyy.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007)
(noting that WHYY, the Philadelphia public broadcaster, creates both local and national programming).
18
See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2) (2000) (authorizing the distribution of federal funds
to noncommercial television stations and content providers).
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ming and providing logistical and technological support.
To that
end, the CPB funds station initiatives aimed at determining how noncommercial stations can better serve their local communities and en20
sures that the programming it finances also serves community needs.
In supporting the development of content, the CPB seeks to further
three particular interests: (1) providing children’s programming with
a high educational value, (2) serving “underserved audiences,” and
(3) contributing to a better-informed citizenry at the national and lo21
cal levels. In addition to financial support, the CPB engages in research endeavors to help guide ongoing federal investment in public
broadcasting.
B. The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967: Constructing a National Institution
With the creation of a regime for federal support of noncommercial broadcasting, Congress intended to maximize the editorial autonomy of individual stations and eliminate the possibility that government-–particularly ruling majority parties-–could influence content
decisions, directly or indirectly. At the time of the enactment of the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, the role that this noncommercial regime was to play in society was not clearly defined, though the possibilities abounded. As such, legislators offered numerous purposes for
noncommercial broadcasting without clearly adopting one or linking
them together in some way. Rather, the Act focused primarily on the
structural creation of an autonomous entity in the CPB, perhaps suggesting that it is for the broadcasters themselves to best determine
their social function by how they choose to operate.
1. Defining the Role of the Public Broadcaster
Myriad justifications for public service broadcasting orbit the universe of media theory, but they all largely revolve around the idea of
market failure. Put simply, market pressures drive private, commercial broadcasters to underproduce certain types of content that are
22
thought to be valuable for society. With a system of noncommercial
19

Corporation for Public Broadcasting, CPB: Goals and Objectives, http://
www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/goals/goalsandobjectives/goalsandobjectives_full.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See generally ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 7-19 (1973) (noting the economic challenges of public broadcasting); C. Edwin
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broadcasting, the government can address this problem by removing
the pressures of an advertising-driven market and by generally prescribing the type of content to be provided.
Beyond that, however, how the specific social role or function of
the public broadcaster should be defined appears open for debate.
Communications scholar Monroe Price, for instance, has offered four
possible definitions for public television: (1) as a “Lifeline,” which
posits that noncommercial television assumes the “residue” of un23
served public interest obligations from commercial broadcasting; (2)
“National Identity,” under which the broadcast system participates in
the creation of a nation-wide cultural identity; (3) “Minority Satisfaction,” under which the broadcaster provides a voice for underserved
minorities so that they may feel included in society; and (4) “Public
Sphere,” which sees the function of noncommercial broadcasting as
an “instrument of civil society” to facilitate deliberative political de24
bate. Noncommercial television may also simply be an effective way
to ensure that the public has access to programming that takes creative risks and seeks to achieve a higher level of quality and inspira25
tion.
2. Building an Autonomous Institution: Passage of the 1967 Act
With the passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (1967
26
Act), which created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Congress sought to correct the “market failure” of commercial broadcasting and, in so doing, provided at least some definition to the role that
27
noncommercial broadcasters should play.
Though local noncomBaker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2113-14 (1992) (discussing the dominance and importance of advertising in eighteenth-century newspapers); Howard A. White, Fine Tuning the Federal Government’s Role in Public Broadcasting,
46 FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 496-97 (1994) (describing the Ford Foundation’s efforts to
promote educational broadcasting).
23
Monroe E. Price, Public Broadcasting and the Crisis of Corporate Governance, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 427 (1999). Defining public broadcasters based on
this “Lifeline” idea would create the opportunity for commercial broadcasters to shed
their existing public interest obligations altogether. Id.
24
Id. at 427-28.
25
See Meredith C. Hightower, Beyond Lights and Wires in a Box: Ensuring the Existence of Public Television, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 133, 137 (1994) (addressing the major aims of
promoting public television).
26
Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399
(2000)).
27
See William D. Rowland Jr., Public Service Broadcasting in the United States: Its Mandate, Institutions, and Conflicts, in PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING IN A MULTICHANNEL
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mercial stations had existed-–and received support from the federal
28
government –-for years, by the late 1960s it appeared that these sta29
tions’ programming efforts were impaired by a lack of funding. In
response to this problem, the Carnegie Corporation sponsored a Congress-supported commission to investigate the status of noncommer30
cial broadcasting nationwide. In light of its findings that financially
healthy local stations would be essential to expanded noncommercial
broadcasting, the Carnegie Commission called for federal funding to
31
supplement existing state and private financing mechanisms. The
Carnegie report also coined the term “public television,” not to distinguish it as the converse to private commercial broadcasters, but to
embody a wide range of political, cultural, and educational program32
ming.
Responding favorably to the Carnegie Commission’s recommendations, Congress passed the 1967 Act, which created a platform for
the nationwide public broadcasting institution we know today. In so
doing, Congress hoped to promote the growth of noncommercial
broadcasting to serve, inter alia, “instructional, educational, and cul33
tural purposes.” The 1967 Act by its terms asserts several apparent
roles for public broadcasting in the United States. In its policy declaration, Congress sought to promote the “general welfare” through
broadcaster responsiveness to the “interests of people . . . in particular
34
localities” and the provision of “alternative” services nationwide. It
also asserted the public interest in “encourag[ing] the development of
ENVIRONMENT: THE HISTORY AND SURVIVAL OF AN IDEAL 157, 160-61 (Robert K. Avery
ed., 1993) (examining Congress’s role in the future direction and mandate of the purpose of noncommercial television).
28
Congress first posited a national system to support noncommercial educational
stations in the Communications Act of 1934. See id. The FCC provided further support for these stations in the 1950s when it set aside 242 channels strictly for noncommercial educational purposes. See In re Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, 41 F.C.C. 148, 158 (1952) (sixth report and order)
(providing 80 VHF and 162 UHF stations for noncommercial use). Then, in 1962,
Congress expanded its support for public broadcasting by offering limited funding for
educational television with the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962. Pub. L.
No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-395 (2000)).
29
See Rowland, supra note 27, at 172-181 (addressing the state of funding for public broadcasting before the Carnegie Commission).
30
See generally CARNEGIE COMM’N ON EDUC. TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A
PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1967).
31
Id. at 33-37.
32
Id. at 1.
33
47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1) (2000).
34
Id. § 396(a)(5).
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programming that . . . addresses the needs of unserved and under35
served audiences, particularly children and minorities.”
Underlying all of these interests was also an appeal for programming of particularly high quality, perhaps implicitly acknowledging a
market failure in this regard. The Senate noted that programming
36
must “approach the highest possible production standards,” and
President Lyndon Johnson hoped that the CPB would assist stations
37
“who aim for the best in broadcasting.” Furthermore, the Senate asserted that “noncommercial broadcasting is uniquely fitted to offer indepth coverage and analysis which will lead to a better informed and
38
enlightened public.”
These varied propositions all resonate in three of the different
39
definitional approaches identified by Professor Price and indicate
that legislators did not contemplate one all-encompassing definitional
framework. The commitment to localism may be a “residual” public
interest “Lifeline” obligation that commercial broadcasters fail to
serve. Second, providing programming for underserved minorities
certainly gets directly at the “Minority Satisfaction” definition. Third,
creating a “better informed and enlightened” citizenry serves Price’s
“Public Sphere” model.
Aside from the legislature’s broad normative discussion of the
aims of public broadcasting, however, the 1967 Act did not focus on
precisely defining the role of that institution. Rather, the main feature of the Act was its creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, for the purpose of “facilitat[ing] the development of public
telecommunications and to afford maximum protection from extra40
neous interference and control.” Indeed, in both the legislative history and statutory text, lawmakers concentrated on providing this independence from government interference with the public
broadcasting institution. In signing the 1967 Act, President Johnson
asserted that the CPB must be “carefully guarded from government or

35

Id. § 396(a)(6).
S. REP. NO. 90-222, at 7 (1967).
37
113 CONG. REC. 23, 31587 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1967) (President Johnson’s statements at the signing of the 1967 Act).
38
S. REP. NO. 90-222, at 7.
39
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
40
47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(10) (2000).
36
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41

party control,” and Senator John Pastore, in a Senate Report, explained that “it is our intention that local stations be absolutely free to
42
determine for themselves what they should or should not broadcast.”
The Senate Report particularly emphasized the need for autonomy in
programming choices at the local level, stating that “[l]ocal autonomy
of stations and diversity of program sources will provide operational
43
safeguards to assure the democratic functioning of the system.”
To maximize the insulation of programming decisions from political pressures, the 1967 Act created, in the CPB, a “nonprofit corporation . . . which will not be an agency or establishment of the United
44
States Government.” The statute set out the structure of the Corporation by creating a Board of Directors and detailing how its directors
45
and officers would be selected. The 1967 Act further ensured that
political affiliation could not be a factor in the President’s choice of
46
board members. Congress then gave fuller effect to the CPB’s independence by establishing a trust for it in the Treasury Department, al47
lowing funds to flow directly to the CPB.
In providing the framework for a national public broadcasting system, Congress clearly intended for the institution—from the CPB at
the federal level down to the individual local station—to have the utmost independence from government influence. Indeed, editorial
autonomy and insulation from political pressures constituted the one
aspect of public broadcasting about which lawmakers appeared so certain that they built it into the structure of the national system. Many
ideas about the social role of noncommercial broadcasting were presented, but none were embraced as clearly as the notion that whatever
their role, the broadcasters should have the freedom to choose their

41

113 CONG. REC. 23, 31587; see also S. REP. NO. 90-222, at 11 (“Noncommercial
television . . . must be absolutely free from any Federal Government interference over
programming.”).
42
S. REP. NO. 90-222, at 11.
43
Id. at 7-8.
44
47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (2000).
45
See id. § 396(c) (outlining the appointment and structure of the CPB Board of
Directors).
46
See id. § 396(c)(2) (prohibiting board members from being employees of the
United States).
47
See Patricia M. Chuh, The Fate of Public Broadcasting in the Face of Federal Funding
Cuts, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 207, 210 (1995) (describing the changes made to public broadcasting during the Carter administration, such as the establishment of a trust
fund with the Treasury).
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own programming—and perhaps even their social and cultural mission—free from government pressure.
II. INDEPENDENCE DENIED? THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING
Despite legislative emphasis on the fact that public broadcasting
should be free from government influence, Supreme Court precedent
indicates that the Court would consider the CPB to be a part of the
government for First Amendment purposes. The immediate implication is clear: the First Amendment asserts that “Congress shall make
48
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” and the Court has extended this limitation to all of government. Thus, decisions by a CPB
considered to be a government entity could be subject to judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, numerous decisions made at the local level (the
“bottom” tier of the system) could also raise First Amendment questions because many stations are administered directly by state gov49
ernments.
Subjecting public broadcasters to traditional First
Amendment scrutiny, however, would lead to results that belie the intended independence of the noncommercial system. Such a result
may therefore call for an alternative constitutional approach to analyses of public broadcasting.
A. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting as Government Entity
Although it has the title of a nonprofit “corporation” and Congress clearly did not intend for it to be considered a government
agency, the CPB’s constitutional status remains somewhat questionable. The General Accounting Office, for instance, included the CPB
in its Profiles of Existing Government Corporations, indicating that it sees
the entity as an independent part of the executive branch, similar to
50
the U.S. Postal Service or the Legal Services Corporation. Furthermore, under Supreme Court analysis of whether an entity is a gov-

48

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See infra Part IV (listing the states whose public broadcasters are run by government agencies).
50
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: PROFILES OF
EXISTING GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 160 (1996); see also Chris Johnson, Comment,
Federal Support of Public Broadcasting: Not Quite What LBJ Had in Mind, 8 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 135, 140-41 (2000) (suggesting that based on its inclusion of the CPB in
the report, the General Accounting Office considered the CPB to be a government
corporation).
49
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ernment agency for First Amendment purposes, there is strong evidence that the Constitution would consider the CPB a state actor.
The Court has implied that for First Amendment analysis, it would
consider the CPB to be a part of the government. In Lebron v. National
Passenger Railroad Corp., the Court held that it considers a government
corporation, in that case Amtrak, part of the federal government if it
has been created by special law for the “furtherance of governmental
objectives” and if the government has retained power to appoint a ma51
jority of its board of directors. The CPB certainly appears to satisfy
these requirements, as it was established by the Public Broadcasting
52
53
Act of 1967 and the President appoints its entire board of directors.
Indeed, in determining that Amtrak was part of the government in the
eyes of the First Amendment, Lebron specifically identified the CPB as
54
a point of comparison. Although Amtrak claimed that its charter’s
disclaimer of agency status prevents it from attaining governmental
status, the Court rejected that argument and held that the First
Amendment could place limits on Amtrak’s speech-restrictive activ55
ity. Under this analysis, the fact that the 1967 Act asserts that it is not
a government agency likely would not save the CPB from a judicial determination that it is part of the government for First Amendment
purposes.
B. First Amendment Implications of Government Agency Status
With this potential government status in mind, under traditional
Supreme Court analysis, application of the Court’s First Amendment
precedents creates results that frustrate congressional intent and the
goals of noncommercial broadcasting. The two potential forms of
government action in this space that would raise First Amendment
questions are (1) direct regulation of programming choices, either by
the federal legislature or executive branch, or by state public television agencies; and (2) placing conditions on funding to public broad51

513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
See 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (2000) (authorizing the establishment of the CPB).
53
See id. § 396(c) (providing that the President shall appoint the nine-member
board of directors, with the “advice and consent” of the Senate).
54
Lebron, 513 U.S. at 391. The Court also put the Legal Services Corporation in
the same group of “government corporations” as the CPB, id., just as the General Accounting Office had done in its report.
55
See id. at 392. The Court then remanded for a determination of whether Amtrak abridged the plaintiff’s speech by censoring an advertisement on an Amtrakowned billboard. Id. at 400.
52
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casters that limit their content decision making. Unfortunately, because of its extreme deference to government, the Supreme Court’s
public forum analysis is unhelpful in fulfilling congressional intent.
Application of public forum and government speech doctrines would
lead to the result that the public broadcaster’s autonomy could be
constitutionally abridged. Likewise, while the Court’s approach to
56
funding conditions under Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez initially appears to protect the editorial functions of the public broadcaster, it
does not do enough to protect institutional independence either.
1. The Limitations of Public Forum Analysis and
Government Employment Cases
a. Speech on Government Property: Public Forum Doctrine
A direct restriction on the editorial choices of a public broadcaster is the most plausible form of action taken by a state public
broadcasting authority administering its stations. Ordinarily, in a
situation where the government owns or operates particular property,
the Court applies public forum analysis to an abridgement of speech
within that space. Under this “public forum doctrine,” the Court decides whether the government property on which the speech occurs is
(1) a “traditional public forum,” (2) a “designated public forum,” or
57
(3) a “nonpublic forum.”
Public property is a “traditional” public forum if it has “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public,” like a street or
58
public park. Direct regulations of speech in a traditional public forum must survive strict scrutiny review, and restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of the speech must be narrowly tailored to a “significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels
59
of communication.”
The “designated public forum” consists of
property that the government intentionally opens for public use as a
60
place for speech activity. Content-based speech restrictions in this

56

531 U.S. 533 (2001).
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
58
Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (noting that traditional public fora have “‘time out of
mind . . . been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions’” (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307
U.S. 496, 515 (1939))).
59
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
60
Id. at 45-46.
57
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space, like those in traditional public forums, must be narrowly tai61
lored to serve a compelling government interest.
Public property
that does not fall into either of these two categories is considered a
“nonpublic forum.” Restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums need
62
only be “reasonable” and viewpoint neutral.
The way the Court has refined the public forum doctrine has created significant weaknesses in this approach, however, and demonstrates that it would be ill-suited for application to public broadcasting. When determining whether a particular space is a “designated
public forum,” the Court asks whether the government has explicitly
63
and intentionally dedicated it to free expression. The practical application of this inquiry, though, raises concerns due to its circularity.
That is, because government adoption of a rule against speech would
itself be evidence of intention not to create a designated public forum,
one cannot challenge the constitutionality of that rule because it is the
very thing that makes the property a designated public forum (and
64
thus allows it to receive relaxed First Amendment scrutiny). Thus,
government restrictions on editorial autonomy in the public broadcasting realm would be impervious to challenge, because the very interference being challenged would cause the space to become a nonpublic forum (which would be a winning case for the government). A
more objective analysis may therefore be necessary to counteract the
deleterious effects of traditional forum analysis for speech generally
and specifically preserving the independence of the public broadcaster. Indeed, the Court seemed to recognized as much in applying

61

Id.
Id. at 46.
63
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992)
(“The decision to create a public forum must . . . be made ‘by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse.’” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985))); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 4546 (describing a “category consist[ing] of public property which the State has opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity” in which the state is “bound by
the same standards [that] apply in a traditional public forum”).
64
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (making essentially this
argument about government “determination” of its property); see also Steven G. Gey,
Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1585
(1998) (“[C]ontrary to the thrust of the First Amendment in other contexts, [in public
forum doctrine] the most effective means for the government to close a forum is to
develop a history of theoretically impermissible content-based regulation of speech in
that forum.”); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1784 (1987) (noting the “vicious circularity of the Court’s concentration on government intent” in public forum doctrine).
62
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a forum-like analysis to public broadcasting in Arkansas Educational
65
Television Commission v. Forbes.
b. Speech within a Government Agency
First Amendment concerns also arise when the speech being
abridged occurs within the context of government employment. In
this context, a court determination that the CPB or a state public
broadcasting authority is truly a government actor for First Amendment purposes has significant consequences for speech. Once the entity is so defined, restrictions on speech are generally more permissible than in the private realm. In Connick v. Myers, for instance, the
Court held that a government employee could be fired for speech that
66
was disruptive of the operation of the office. Connick indicated that
government could legitimately regulate speech within its own agencies
67
if that speech conflicted with its asserted goals. Professor Baker posits that this approach follows a general trend begun by Grayned v. City
68
of Rockford, which asked if the expression involved was “basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
69
time.” Robert Post takes a more restrictive view of the doctrine, suggesting that in the “managerial domains” of government agencies,
speech is properly subordinated to the goals of the government en70
tity.
The negative potential for public broadcasting in this context is
fairly self-evident. If the public broadcasting system (at least, at the

65

523 U.S. 666 (1998). Forbes’s treatment of public broadcasters within the illfitting public forum doctrine provides the basis of my proposal for an objective institutional analysis. See infra Part III.
66
461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (“The limited First Amendment interest involved here
does not require that [the employer] tolerate action which [it] reasonably believed
would disrupt the office, undermine [its] authority, and destroy close working relationships.”).
67
Id. at 146.
68
408 U.S. 104 (1972). Grayned evaluated a city ordinance on noise trucks by asking whether the expression “is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.” Id. at 116.
69
Id. at 116; see also C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1998) (arguing for a “broadened version of the principle developed in Grayned v. City of Rockford . . . a condition that restricts a constitutionally protected activity should only be permissible if the activity is fundamentally imcompatible with the purpose for which the government makes the resource available”).
70
See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 247-52 (1995) (distinguishing between “management” and “governance” as types of authority within government institutions).
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CPB and state commission levels) is truly a government entity for First
Amendment purposes, actors motivated by undue political pressure
could legitimately act to suppress speech within the public broadcast71
ing institution by manipulating its stated goals. Thus, like its public
forum analysis, the Court’s government employee speech analysis
would fail to fully insulate the editorial independence of noncommercial broadcasters.
2. Funding Conditions and the First Amendment:
Is Velazquez Useful to Public Broadcasting?
Although public forum doctrine seems to leave significant potential for direct government intrusion into public broadcasting, there is
still hope for protection against government conditions on funding
under Supreme Court precedent. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,
the Court held that the federal government could not impose funding
conditions that limited the speech of Legal Services Corporation
(LSC) attorneys in a way that prevented them from fully performing
72
73
their jobs. Distinguishing its decision in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court
asserted that the government could not define the contours of a funding program using restrictions that distort the “usual functioning” of a
74
medium of expression. Because the restrictions on LSC’s funding
prohibited attorneys from making certain arguments—such as challenging the constitutionality of welfare rulings—that might be necessary to effective representation of their clients, the government regu75
lation was deemed impermissible under the First Amendment.

71

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951
(2006), demonstrates that the Court’s approach continues to support this conclusion.
The majority in Garcetti, which included newly appointed Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, held that statements made by public employees in the course of their official
duties are not insulated from employer retaliation by the First Amendment. Id. at
1960. The Court reasoned that when speaking pursuant to the duties of their employment, such employees are not “citizens” entitled to full First Amendment protection. Id. at 1958.
72
531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) (“Where private speech is involved, even Congress’
antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government’s own interest.”).
73
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
74
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.
75
See id. at 548 (“The attempted restriction is designed to insulate the Government’s interpretation of the Constitution from judicial challenge. The Constitution
does not permit the Government to confine litigants and their attorneys in this manner.”).
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If the government were to create a similar funding condition for
public broadcasting limiting its content choices, Velazquez would ap76
pear to say that such a restriction violates the First Amendment. Indeed, the Velazquez majority explicitly referred to the Court’s public
broadcasting cases as support for its argument, stating that, “[t]he
First Amendment forbade the Government from using the [public
broadcasting] forum in an unconventional way to suppress speech in77
herent in the nature of the medium.” With this in mind, whether
the Court would consider the CPB a government agency becomes particularly important. If it is a government agency, then the CPB itself,
in addition to the legislature or executive, could be prohibited from
placing conditions on funding for individual broadcasters that distort
their usual functioning.
Analyzing such a situation, however, brings to light a shortcoming
of the Velazquez analysis with respect to the public broadcasting system.
While that case inquires into whether the limitation countervails an
institution’s “usual functioning,” it provides little guidance for how,
outside the facts before it, one determines what that functioning is. In
Velazquez, determining the role of the LSC lawyer was fairly straightforward, particularly as “effective assistance” has at least some indis78
putable basic contours.
Applying the Court’s analysis to a public
broadcaster, however, would be less clear. As we have seen, Congress
itself conceived of numerous roles for public broadcasting in the
79
communications order and in society generally. Furthermore, if the
protected function of the public broadcaster is the exercise of editorial discretion (as the Court seems to imply by referring to League of
76

See Andrew D. Cotlar, Say Cheese: The Constitutionality of State-Mandated Free Airtime on Public Broadcasting Stations in Wisconsin, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 76-77 (2003) (arguing that under Velazquez, Wisconsin public broadcasting statutes are impermissible
because they violate editorial independence).
77
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543. The Court cited its consideration of the “dynamics of
the broadcast industry” in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364
(1984) and Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
These cases are examined in greater detail in Part III, infra, but for this Part’s purposes
note that those cases did not, in fact, deal with funding conditions and are thus not
directly on point for this analysis. Rather, they applied the First Amendment’s restrictions to direct government regulation of speech and access, respectively.
78
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544 (“[LSC] lawyers funded in the government program
may not undertake representation in suits for benefits if they must advise clients respecting the questionable validity of a statute which defines benefit eligibility and the
payment structure. The limitation forecloses advice or legal assistance to question the
validity of statutes under the Constitution of the United States.”).
79
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (noting the various purposes of
public broadcasting asserted in the 1967 Act’s text and legislative history).
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Women Voters and Forbes), we still need an operative principle on which
80
to make that choice. In the conditional funding context, Velazquez is
thus of limited use to a First Amendment analysis of any potential
government action against public broadcasting.
Unfortunately, traditional First Amendment jurisprudence appears to be of little help to the cause of editorial autonomy that Congress intended to promote for public broadcasting. Public forum doctrine and government speech cases provide a level of deference to the
government that would in many cases allow direct government intervention into programming choices. While the government’s—and
possibly the CPB’s—potential power to place speech-restrictive conditions on funding seems limited by Velazquez, the case cannot be cited
to fully protect editorial autonomy. Thus, for congressional intent to
be preserved, an alternative approach to the institution of public
broadcasting is required.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, FORBES,
AND OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING
As we have seen, traditional First Amendment analysis of speech
related to government property, employment, and funding conditions
leaves open the possibility that the government could constitutionally
abridge the speech choices of public broadcasters. This result, which
is antithetical to original congressional intention, is bolstered by—if
not grounded in—the likelihood that the Court could consider public
broadcasters to be part of the government. For the public broadcasting system’s First Amendment status to more closely resemble what
Congress intended in designing the institution, then, a new approach
is needed.
Fortunately, the Court has provided an indication of how it might
view public broadcasting for First Amendment purposes in FCC v.
81
League of Women Voters of California and Arkansas Educational Television
82
Commission v. Forbes. These cases imply that when determining how
the First Amendment will apply to public broadcasting, the Court
should look not at the government’s own asserted interests but instead
at the objective characteristics of how the institution is organized. As
we have seen, the potential functions of the public broadcaster are di-

80
81
82

Part III, infra, takes up the task of finding such a principle.
468 U.S. 364.
523 U.S. 666.
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verse, and there is not a clear, principled way to favor any particular
one. Instead, by focusing on the one attribute that is built into the
structure of the system—editorial autonomy—the Court can preserve
all these social capabilities of the public broadcaster and maximize
protection of speech.
This Part will thus examine how League of Women Voters and Forbes
provide analytical support for such an objective approach to speech
institutions under the First Amendment. It will then explain how such
an approach not only fills in the gaps of existing First Amendment
analysis but also makes the jurisprudence more coherent, creates
more desirable results for the public broadcasting system, and preserves Congress’s original intent.
A. The Public Broadcasting Cases and the Objective Approach
The Court’s public broadcasting cases lend support to this objective analysis through their emphasis on the fact that public broadcasters should be accorded the same editorial discretion as commercial
broadcasters. Although neither opinion explicitly purports to do so,
the Court implicitly recognizes that the objective characteristics of the
public broadcaster provide an effective way of defining its status in the
eyes of the First Amendment. The Court thus works to preserve the
independence of noncommercial broadcasting by noting that the
structure of public broadcasting gives its programming choices, under
the First Amendment, the same constitutional protection as those of
private entities.
1. FCC v. League of Women Voters
In a five to four decision, League of Women Voters overturned as unconstitutional section 399 of the amended Communications Act of
1934, which prohibited noncommercial broadcasters from editorializ83
ing. The majority introduced its First Amendment scrutiny by stating that “although the Government’s interest in ensuring balanced
coverage of public issues is plainly both important and substantial, we
have . . . made clear that broadcasters are engaged in a vital and inde-

83

League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402. The provision—introduced by the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967—also prohibited noncommercial broadcast stations from
supporting or opposing candidates for political office. This part of the provision, however, was not challenged on appeal. Id. at 371 n.9.
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84

pendent form of communicative activity.” The analysis that followed
involved a thorough explication of the extensive ways in which the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting and Public Broadcasting System
were organized to maximize their insulation from political pressures
85
in government. Thus, according to the Court, the institution created by the Public Broadcasting Act “would be as insulated from fed86
eral interference as the wholly private stations.” In striking down the
relevant provision of section 399, the Court then held that it was an
insufficiently justified “abridgment of important journalistic freedoms
87
which the First Amendment jealously protects.”
In its analysis, the League of Women Voters Court appears to be telling Congress that because it structured public broadcasting in a way
that so closely resembles commercial broadcasting, the First Amendment protects journalistic discretion in the same way for both. In
other words, the legislature cannot build a public broadcasting system
around the principle of autonomy enjoyed by all broadcasters and
then seek to violate that same independence by restricting editorial
speech, a crucial element of independent journalism. Though the
Court does not state it directly, implicit in this conclusion is the idea
that the Court will define an institution’s functioning and status (i.e.,
government entity or not) based on how it was objectively organized,
not based on the interest asserted by the government at the time of
litigation.
2. Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
Like League of Women Voters, the Court in Forbes declined to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial broadcasters when it
came to applying First Amendment principles. Forbes reviewed a First
Amendment challenge against the Arkansas Educational Television
Commission’s (AETC) decision to exclude an independent candidate
88
from a televised political debate. Though it was not explicitly part of
his analysis, Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion with a brief

84

Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
The Court referenced, inter alia, the private, bipartisan structure of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and cited extensive legislative history indicating the intention to grant maximum independence to public broadcasters. See id. at 386-95.
86
Id. at 394.
87
Id. at 402.
88
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670-71 (1998).
85
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acknowledgement of the way the AETC was organized by statute.
Specifically, he pointed to the fact that members of the AETC are
barred from holding any federal or state office and that the Commis90
sion employs a staff of professional journalists.
Furthermore, the
opinion made particular note of the fact that the AETC employed a
“Statement of Principles of Editorial Integrity in Public Broadcasting,
which counsel adherence to generally accepted broadcasting industry
standards, so that the programming service is free from pressure from
91
political . . . supporters.”
The Court went on to determine that public broadcasting was not
92
a public forum under its forum analysis. If the public broadcaster
were a government actor for constitutional purposes, this result would
surely not hold under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence,
which sees viewpoint discrimination by government actors as anath93
ema. The Court explained that if it applied public forum principles
like it does for government entities, “[p]rogramming decisions would
be particularly vulnerable to claims of [viewpoint discrimination] because even principled exclusions rooted in sound journalistic judg94
ment can often be characterized as viewpoint based.” The fact that
the AETC was nominally a government actor, then, clearly did not
guide the First Amendment analysis in Forbes. What does explain the
Court’s conclusions, though, is the idea that the Court should look at
the objective characteristics of an institution to determine its First
Amendment status. That the AETC was organized to be insulated
from political pressures likely did much of the work in Forbes. This
would explain why the Court gave public broadcasting the same First
Amendment treatment it gives private speakers.
An objective analysis of the institutions at work in the case also
explains why the Court viewed the debates themselves as distinct from
other programming decisions “rooted” in editorial judgment. The
majority held that unlike other programming, the debate was a non-

89

Id. at 669-70.
Id.
91
Id. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92
Id. at 678-80 (noting that the government did not intend to make the opportunity generally available to a class of speakers, and that AETC reserved the power to determine a participant’s eligibility).
93
See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding that a
city ordinance whose “operative distinction” was the subject matter of the speech violated the First Amendment).
94
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673.
90
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public forum (and thus subject to the Court’s developed forum analy95
sis) because of its “special characteristics.”
Justice Kennedy again
examined the structural characteristics of this electoral institution,
noting that “the debate was by design a forum for political speech by
96
the candidates.” Given the sensitivity to imposing obligations of a
political nature on a public broadcaster inherent in its design, the institutional separation that results from the Court’s analysis here makes
sense. Although the debate was a form of programming—and required basic editorial decision making about the setup—just like
other types of content, its inherent structural characteristics made it
(in the eyes of the Court’s First Amendment analysis) a debate, not a
television show. The distinction demonstrates, then, the Court’s willingness to extend an inquiry into the physical characteristics of a space
to the organizational structure of the institutions at work in a given situa97
tion and separate them accordingly.
In dissent, Justice Stevens vigorously stressed the importance of
the fact that the AETC was state owned, asserting that the majority
“understates the constitutional importance of the distinction between
98
state ownership and private ownership of broadcast facilities.” Underlying his objections to the Court’s treatment of the public broadcaster as a de facto private entity under the First Amendment was Justice Stevens’s concern that the AETC—an arm of the state executive
branch—would be able to subjectively define the scope of its own discretion. He noted that, “[b]ecause AETC is owned by the State, deference to its interest in making ad hoc decisions about the political
content of its programs necessarily increases the risk of government
censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of privately
99
owned broadcasters does not.”
Justice Stevens’s arguments and concerns about the editorial decision making of the AETC are countered, though, by an analytical
principle that inquires not into the subjective intent of the stateowned broadcaster, but the objective organization of that entity.
95

Id. at 676.
Id. at 675 (emphasis added) (“[C]andidate debates present the narrow exception to the rule [that public broadcasting is not a public forum] . . . [because] a candidate debate . . . is different from other programming.”).
97
See Part III.B.2.a, infra, for a discussion of how this analysis extends a similar
objective inquiry into other public forum cases.
98
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 689. Justice Stevens expressed particular concern about that fact that
Forbes’s constitutional claim was being rejected “on the basis of [AETC’s] entirely subjective, ad hoc judgments about the dimensions of its forum.” Id. at 690.
96
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Thus, the fact that the AETC was structured to pursue journalistic—not
political—goals indicates that the Court could proceed differently if
political pressures clearly did drive content decisions and not standards of journalistic discretion. Such a consideration of the structure
of the public broadcaster would then alleviate Stevens’s concerns that
the AETC could be used as a mouthpiece for the ruling political party.
In both League of Women Voters and Forbes, the Court declined to
consider public broadcasters to be government entities. Instead, recognition of the fact that they were organized in a way that was consistent with independent private and autonomous broadcasters led to the
conclusion that noncommercial broadcast speech would receive similarly relaxed First Amendment scrutiny.
B. Implications of the Objective Approach for First Amendment Jurisprudence
The Court need not accept an objective approach for the sole
purpose of realizing the intended structure of public broadcasting.
An objective approach can provide a meaningful solution where First
Amendment analysis fails to provide robust protection of speech or
suffers from circular logic. Furthermore, such a method has already,
in fact, been employed in First Amendment analysis of expressive institutions outside the public broadcasting context and would thus be
more likely to gain acceptance by a majority of the Court. Examining
the objective attributes of a government agency or governmentfunded entity offers clearer guidance on how to apply the Court’s
precedents in several doctrinal areas.
1. Situating the Objective Approach Within the First Amendment
Landscape: Keller v. State Bar of California
The Court has previously used an objective analytical procedure
instead of giving deference to government assertions about its interests in an expressive institution. In Keller v. State Bar of California, the
Court considered whether the California Bar association violated the
First Amendment by using compulsory membership dues to fund lobbying and other ideological activities with which some members dis100
agreed.
The California Supreme Court had ruled that the bar association was a regulated governmental agency, and this status allowed it
to use its dues for any legitimate purpose, without First Amendment

100

496 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990).

2007]

FREEDOM BY DESIGN

1013

101

constraint.
Reversing that decision, a unanimous Supreme Court
disregarded the fact that the bar was a regulated state agency, looking
instead at its “specialized characteristics” that “distinguish it from the
102
role of the typical government official or agency.”
In determining whether the state bar was in fact a government entity for First Amendment purposes, the Court considered, inter alia,
the types of services the bar provided and the relationship between
103
the institution and its constituency.
Based on these characteristics,
it found a “substantial analogy” between the state bar and employee
unions, explicitly disagreeing that the bar association acted like a gov104
ernment agency.
Because it was organized in a way that closely resembled unions, the Court proceeded on the assumption that the bar
association should be accorded the same constitutional status as un105
ions, at least with respect to the First Amendment.
Thus, applying
106
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and its progeny, the Court held
that the organization could not use mandatory dues to pay for those
107
activities not “germane” to the reasons for which the state bar exists.
As a result, the Court appears to embrace an approach that examines the objective characteristics of the entity to determine how the
First Amendment will apply to it. Indeed, the Court explained that
this lack of deference to the government’s assertions rested upon a
general jurisprudential principle:
Of course the Supreme Court of California is the final authority on
the “governmental” status of the State Bar of California for purposes of
state law. But its determination that respondent is a “government
agency,” and therefore entitled to the treatment accorded a governor, a

101

Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1029 (1989).
Keller, 496 U.S. at 12.
103
Id. at 11-12.
104
Id. at 12 (“There is . . . a substantial analogy between the relationship of the
State Bar and its members, on the one hand, and the relationship of employee unions
and their members, on the other.”).
105
See id. at 12 (noting that just as agency-shop laws may permissibly prevent the
benefits negotiated by union members to spill over to free-riding, nonunion members,
lawyers—all of whom benefit from the bar association’s work—might be required to
pay a “fair share” of the association’s costs irrespective of the First Amendment).
106
431 U.S. 209 (1977). Abood upheld “agency-shop” rules that compelled teachers to pay union membership dues even if the union engaged in ideological activities
with which the teacher disagreed. Id. at 235. However, the union could not, consistent with the First Amendment, fund those activities with the mandatory dues collected
from teachers. Id. at 235-36. This essentially required the unions to keep segregated
funds going forward.
107
Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14.
102
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mayor, or a state tax commission, for instance, is not binding on us when
108
such a determination is essential to the decision of a federal question.

In the public broadcasting context, then, the Court could employ
Keller’s analysis to determine whether a state broadcasting commission
would actually be a government entity for constitutional purposes. An
objective approach could thus lead to a determination, contrary to the
implications of Lebron, that the First Amendment protects the autonomy of the public broadcaster as a nongovernmental entity.
2. Addressing the Shortcomings of Traditional
First Amendment Analysis
a. Public Forum Doctrine and Government Employee Cases
An analysis of public broadcasting’s objective characteristics would
redress the circularity inherent in the Court’s tendency to make determinations about forum category based on the government’s subjective intention. In fact, Justice Kennedy advocated a similar approach
in his opinion in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
(ISKCON). Although he concurred in the result, Kennedy noted that
the Court’s analysis was flawed because it asserted that the “public forum status of public property depends on the government’s defined
purpose for the property, or on an explicit decision by the govern109
ment to dedicate the property to expressive activity.”
The correct
inquiry, in his view, “must be an objective one, based on the actual,
110
physical characteristics and uses of the property.” Speech should be
protected, Justice Kennedy argued, so long as it is not incompatible
111
with those objective attributes and uses.
A similar objective analysis
was likely driving Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Forbes, as that case contained no mention of the subjective forum principles to which he objected in ISKCON and appeared to acknowledge the editorial auton-

108

Id. at 11.
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 698 (“If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and
the actual public uses and uses that have been permitted by the government indicate
that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum.”).
109
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omy inherent in the creation of public broadcasting. In a way, Forbes
further extended Kennedy’s analysis of the objective characteristics of
the physical space in ISKCON to the organizational structures of differ113
ent institutions operating within that space.
This inquiry into what type of entity the government objectively
created applies to government employee cases as well, particularly
under the analyses in this area by Professors Baker and Post. Examining the objective characteristics of a government entity would enable
courts to undertake an analysis of compatibility between the entity’s
114
efficient operation and the restrictions imposed on speech.
In Connick, for example, determining the level of disruption caused by employee speech required an assessment of what the government was actually trying to do in maintaining the agency office. If this
determination is based purely on the interests proffered by the government at trial, however, speech will never be protected, for the
same reasons that plague the Court’s forum analysis. Instead, the objective characteristics of the space—its organizational structure, the
contractual job descriptions given to employees, etc.—provide the
neutral principle that maximizes speech protection. Thus, were the
public broadcaster to be considered a government agency for First
Amendment purposes, the fact that Congress endowed the broadcaster with the structural characteristics of an autonomous body
should lead courts to preserve its editorial independence.
b. Analyzing Conditions on Funding
An approach that considers the objective characteristics of an institution would also give greater clarity to the Court’s analysis of
speech-related conditions on government funding. While Velazquez
prohibits speech restrictions that contravene the “usual functioning”
of an institution, the Court did not offer any guidance on how to de115
termine that function.
Focusing on what the legislature objectively

112

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (“Public and
private broadcasters alike are not only permitted, but indeed required, to exercise substantial editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their programming.”).
113
See supra Part III.A.2.
114
See Baker, supra note 69, at 9-10 (“[A] condition that restricts a constitutionally
protected activity should only be permissible if the activity is fundamentally incompatible with the purpose for which the government makes the resources available.”).
115
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001) (noting the difficulty of defining the customary functions of the public broadcaster, considering how
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created, however, provides a framework for that analysis and still restricts the extent to which government can define the scope of a funding program. Thus, a consideration of the “usual functioning” of a
public broadcaster would begin with an inquiry into how the public
broadcasting system was constructed. Consequently, the autonomy
built into the system by statute would be given full effect in the face of
potential speech-related conditions on federal funding.
IV. APPLYING THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING
Having seen how an analysis of public broadcasting’s objective
characteristics is useful for determining its First Amendment status,
the empirical question remains as to how such an approach would apply to the public broadcast system. This Part briefly considers how a
reviewing court would scrutinize the structure of a public broadcasting entity. Although they are interconnected within the U.S. system,
and Congress desired autonomy for both, the federal and state levels
of public broadcasting face somewhat distinct hypothetical challenges
to their independence. Thus, this Part will begin with a brief examination of the organizational structure of the CPB at the federal level
and its implications for First Amendment analysis. It then performs
the same analysis at the state level, using New Jersey public broadcasting as a sample case.
A. The Structure of Public Broadcasting at the Federal Level
As has already been described, with the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967, Congress structured the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
intending to maximize the editorial autonomy of public broadcast116
ing.
Indeed, the CPB’s structural elements bear out this intention
and ground that autonomy in objective attributes. For instance, the
CPB has an internal system of governance, organized to have a politi117
118
cally diverse membership serving staggered, limited terms.
These

many roles it is supposed to play in society according to congressional mandate); see
supra Part II.B.2.
116
See supra Part I (noting the creation of a CPB trust, and that in the selection
process for the CPB’s Board of Directors, the President cannot base his selection on
political affiliation).
117
See 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1) (2000) (“No more than 5 members of the Board appointed by the President may be members of the same political party.”).
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features imbue the entity with an autonomy not enjoyed by other government agencies, whose leadership can easily be removed at the will
of the executive branch. Therefore, the CPB should not be considered a government entity for First Amendment purposes, regardless of
the result under state action doctrine. This conclusion would give
recognition to the fact that Congress found the autonomy of the
broadcaster to be so important that they built it into the organizational structure of the institution.
Furthermore, the fact that the CPB is prohibited from using po119
litical criteria to select officers and employees, combined with the
bipartisanship of its directorship mandated by statute, demonstrates
that the “usual functioning” of the public broadcaster depends on its
ability to make editorial decisions free from partisan interests. Under
Velazquez, then, this analysis could prohibit a CPB director (such as the
chairman) from placing content-based restrictions on program funding that were motivated by political concerns. Thus, though the CPB
may nominally be considered a “government agency” under the
Court’s state action doctrine, determinations of the validity of programming decisions must be screened for their separation from partisan interests, consistent with the structure and functioning of the organization.
B. The Structure of Public Broadcasting at the State Level
A large number of state public broadcasting systems are super120
vised by state-operated independent commissions.
Of these, New
Jersey’s system is typical; it provides a useful test case because it is one
of the relatively few state systems whose activity has faced constitu-

118

Id. § 396(c)(5) (providing for six-year terms for members of the Board of Directors).
119
Id. § 396(e)(2) (“[N]o political test or qualification shall be used in selecting . . . officers, agents, and employees of the Corporation.”).
120
For examples of state statutory provisions creating state-operated independent
commissions to monitor state public broadcasting systems, see ALA. CODE §§ 16-7-1 to
16-7-5 (LexisNexis 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3-101 to 6-3-105 (1999); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-13-1(a) (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.84 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
168.010 (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2501 (2001); MD. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. §§ 24-201 to 24-207 (LexisNexis 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-63-1 (West 1999);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1313 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-3 (West 1998); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 16-61-2(a) (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-7-10 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2
(LexisNexis 2003). See also Cotlar, supra note 76, at 57-58 & n.6 (providing an overview
of statewide public broadcasting systems in the United States).
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121

tional challenge.
By state statute, New Jersey’s system is supervised
122
and controlled by the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Commission.
Though the Commission is explicitly “established in the Executive
Branch of the State Government,” like the 1967 Act’s description of
the CPB, the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority Act of 1968
makes a nominal attempt to assert the Commission’s independence
123
from the government.
As we have seen, however, it is not entirely
124
clear that this would be controlling for First Amendment purposes.
Thus, a consideration of the objective characteristics of the Commission is useful to determine the constitutional standards that would apply.
Despite its apparent creation as a government entity, the Commission has an internal structure of democratic governance that ensures
its decisions will be made independent of political pressure. While
five members of the fifteen-member Commission must be administrative officials, a large majority (ten members) are private New Jersey
125
residents. These citizen-members serve staggered terms of five years
each and must be selected “without regard to political belief or affilia126
tion.”
The Commission elects its own officers, including the chair127
man and vice chairman, by an internal vote of its members.
That the Commission has its own governance and cannot be selected based on political affiliation strongly indicates that it should be
insulated from partisan pressures under the First Amendment. Like
the AETC in Forbes, such a self-sufficient structure connotes a degree
of autonomy that would be violated if the Commission were treated by
a traditional First Amendment analysis taken under the assumption
128
that the public broadcaster is a government actor.
Furthermore, by
121

See McGlynn v. N.J. Pub. Broad. Auth., 439 A.2d 54, 63 (N.J. 1981) (clarifying
the “balance, fairness and equity” provision of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-7(h)); Arons v.
N.J. Network, 775 A.2d 778, 784 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that under
the statutory provisions, the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority has discretion
with respect to balanced news coverage and related programming).
122
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-4(a).
123
Id. § 48:23-3 (“[T]he authority is hereby allocated within the Department of
Public Utilities, but notwithstanding said allocation, the authority shall be independent
of any supervision or control by the department or by any board or officer thereof.”).
124
See supra Part II.A.
125
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-4(b).
126
Id. § 48:23-4(c).
127
Id. § 48:23-4(f).
128
See supra Part III.A.2 (noting that an objective analysis of the institutions involved likely drove the Court’s separation of the debate forum from other programming).
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considering the organizational structure of the broadcaster in an objective way to help determine its “usual functionings,” the Court could
very well be hostile to any editorial decisions made in the name of partisan concerns. That is, if the broadcasting institution is organized in
such a way as to be insulated by pressure from ruling political interests, then any decisions made as a result of that pressure may be invalid under the First Amendment.
Of course, defining what is a “legitimate” exercise of editorial discretion is a broad subject of debate about the social role of journalism. While that debate is outside the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that by focusing on the institutional autonomy clearly
imbued in the structure of the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Commission, objective First Amendment analysis allows the broadcasters,
rather than the government, to define their role and respond to the
needs of the community. Regardless of how that role is defined, decisions made in the name of partisan interests—rather than accepted
standards of editorial discretion—should be struck down under Ve129
lazquez and League of Women Voters.
CONCLUSION
Incidents like the one that led to Kenneth Tomlinson’s resignation as the CPB Chairman certainly raise important concerns about
the governance of public broadcasting in the United States. That
Congress intended the U.S. system of public broadcasting to be walled
off from partisan concerns is without question, and when that wall is
breached, the integrity of the system is called into question. An objective jurisprudential approach under the First Amendment provides
hope for a solution, though. Traditional First Amendment analysis
puts the nongovernmental status of public broadcasting into question,
and fails to fully protect the editorial autonomy Congress envisioned
with the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. Consistent with the Court’s
decisions in Forbes and League of Women Voters, however, an analysis that
asks what exactly is created, based on objective criteria of the structure,
more fully achieves this congressional intent. An application of this
principle to the state and federal tiers of the public broadcasting sys-

129

Analysis of the objective characteristics of the New Jersey Public Broadcasting
Commission further supports this proposition, as its individual employees (including
journalists and in-house content providers) must be chosen “solely on grounds of fitness to perform their duties” and not based on party affiliation. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 48:23-6 (West 1998).
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tem would allow courts to recognize public broadcasting autonomy
while shielding against partisan influence on content decisions. Thus,
with its autonomy secure, public broadcasting would be free under
the First Amendment to fully explore the myriad social roles Congress
envisioned, free from government influence.

